Sears reaches deal with Chairman Eddie Lampert to save company and roughly 400 stores Published Wed, Jan 16 2019 • 8:11 AM EST | Updated Wed, Jan 16 2019 • 1:23 PM EST Lauren Hirsch
Sears Holdings reaches a roughly $5 billion deal with its chairman, Eddie Lampert, according to a person familiar with the situation.
The deal would keep the company, and 400 stores in operation, the source says.
Peter Morgan | Reuters
Midday Tuesday, billionaire Eddie Lampert’s efforts to keep Sears alive were dead.
Lawyers and bankers who had been holed up in the offices of Weil, Gotshal & Manges on Fifth Avenue to work out a deal between Lampert and Sears Holdings were resigned to the reality that the company would liquidate and the Sears chairman’s efforts to save up to 50,000 jobs would have been for naught, people familiar with the situation told CNBC.
There were too many sticking points, according to the people, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the information is confidential.
The roughly $5 billion offer Lampert was making through an affiliate of his hedge fund ESL Investments wasn’t large enough to cover all of the company’s administrative expenses, like vendor payments and advisory fees. Sears’ unsecured creditors had virulently argued since day one against Lampert’s efforts to revive the retailer. The offer relied on a $1.3 billion so-called credit bid, meaning the deal is funded in part by forgiving debt owed to ESL. Sears’ unsecured creditors have objected to its use.
Sears called up the bankruptcy judge to share the news.
But Judge Robert Drain didn’t accept it, the person said. He told Sears and ESL to give it another go. There was a chance of saving thousands of jobs and they should try to figure out how to do so – by midnight.
Sears and ESL’s lawyers hunkered down again, as advisors ran through the offices meeting with Sears’ restructuring committee and ESL.
But midnight came and went. By 2 a.m., after hours of gamesmanship and negotiations, Sears and ESL finally reached a deal. ESL agreed to boost its offer by about $150 million, putting the full bid slightly over $5.2 billion, the people said, and keeping the company from shutting about 400 stores.
Lampert found yet one more rabbit to pull out of a hat with a seemingly infinite capacity for bunnies.
Neither Sears nor ESL are out of the woods yet. Sears unsecured creditors are opposed to the bid, people familiar with situation said. They have said there may be claims against Sears for deals done under Lampert’s tenure as CEO and its largest shareholder, which include Sears’ spinoff of Lands’ End in 2014 and transactions with Seritage Growth Properties, a real estate investment trust Lampert created through some Sears’ properties a year later.
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Sears CEO and Board Chairman Eddie Lampert, pictured in 2004, could make billions from Sears's bankruptcy.
By now, Prospect readers probably know the basic story of the demise of Sears. The company that pioneered the 20th-century version of e-commerce—the catalog—did not succumb to 21st-century innovations like Amazon and Walmart. Rather, it was dismantled piece by piece by Eddie Lampert, the hedge fund titan (and former Yale roommate of Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin) who purchased it in 2005. Lampert and his hedge fund engaged in relentless financial engineering to suck out all the value from Sears and leave a desiccated husk, which now could face possible liquidation in bankruptcy.
But just how much did Lampert vacuum out? That’s a surprisingly hard question to answer, if only because of the variety of schemes he employed. Lampert was at one point simultaneously Sears’s CEO, board chairman, transaction partner, landlord, and banker. (Upon the bankruptcy filing, he stepped down as CEO.) Because of his outsized role as Sears’s number-one creditor, he stands to gain in a bankruptcy even if his shares of Sears stock get wiped out. Through this ploy, Lampert has been able to transfer to himself all the salvageable assets of the company. And so far, it’s worked out.
If you look just to Lampert’s compensation as chairman and CEO, you might conclude that he put all his efforts into making Sears a success. Lampert typically took no salary in his roles at Sears, and despite numerous buybacks and other schemes to raise the stock price, he did not engage in any quick-buck stock sales, opting instead to accumulate shares. Currently, Lampert personally holds a 31 percent stake in Sears, and his hedge fund, ESL Investments, holds another 18 percent. That stock has drastically plummeted to near-zero levels, and Lampert has taken a bath.
It’s standard practice in a private equity–style play to load up the portfolio company with debt as a means by which the private equity lender can extract the corporate cash flow. It’s decidedly atypical for the CEO himself to be the lender, however.
But it’s important not to overlook Lampert’s other Sears-related revenue streams. First, Lampert has been lending Sears enormous amounts of money. It’s standard practice in a private equity–style play to load up the portfolio company with debt as a means by which the private equity lender can extract the corporate cash flow. It’s decidedly atypical for the CEO himself to be the lender, however. As of now, Lampert’s ESL and a related fund called JPP own roughly $2.66 billion in Sears debt. The cash flow just on the interest on these notes is between $200 million and $225 million per year.
This figure continues to grow—ESL announced on Monday another $300 million debtor-in-possession loan to support operations through the end of the year.
Presumably, this debt would be significantly curtailed in bankruptcy. However, a fair bit of the debt is secured by Sears’s real-estate assets. For example, real-estate collateral on 46 Sears properties backs a $500 million loan ESL made in January 2017; the bankruptcy could lead to Lampert’s fund simply obtaining those property rights. In all, Lampert’s interests own around $1.5 billion in secured debt backed by real estate.
ESL previously proposed an out-of-court restructuring proposal in which Sears would repurchase all the secured debt at full value, which would essentially have been a direct transfer of tangible assets from Sears to Lampert. Other creditors rejected the plan. But since secured lenders are paid out first in bankruptcy, something like ESL’s proposal is likely to go through; Sears listed $7 billion in assets with its bankruptcy filing.
A bankruptcy judge must make these determinations, and this will probably bring heavy scrutiny on various conflicts of interest in Lampert’s dealings. But some of Sears’s assets have already been ferried into Lampert’s hands.
In 2015, Lampert split off 235 of Sears’s most profitable stores and 31 other Sears real-estate holdings, selling it to a publicly traded real-estate investment trust (REIT) called Seritage Growth Properties for $2.7 billion. The sale/leaseback deal, common in private equity, has Sears paying Seritage rent on the use of the Sears facilities it once owned. Lampert’s hedge fund owns 43.5 percent of the Seritage limited partnership; he serves as its chairman.